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DALEHITE v. UNITED STATES: A NEW APPROACH
TO THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT?
MASSILLON M. HEUSER*

The decision for the United States in Dalehite v. United States,'
though by a closely divided Supreme Court, possibly indicates a turning point in litigation involving the construction of the Federal Tort
Claims Act.2 The trend theretofore had been to expand the concept
of suability and liability expressed in the Act. In United States v.
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.3 the Court had established the right
of an insurer-subrogee to sue in its own name on a portion of a claim
arising in favor of the insured-subrogor, despite the Anti-Assignment
Statute4 and the obvious procedural and administrative difficulties
not dealt with in any wise by the statute. As a rhetorical conclusion
to the Court's opinion, Chief Justice Vinson quoted 5 Judge Cardozo:
"The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough, where
consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of
construction, where consent has been announced." 6

The decision in United States v. Yellow Cab Co. 7 upheld the right
of plaintiffs to join private parties as co-defendants with the United
* Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Chief of the Tort Section
1948-53; member of Virginia bar since 1928. The views expressed are those
of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of Justice.
1. 346 U.S. 15, 73 Sup. Ct. 956, 97 L. Ed. 1427 (1953).
2. 60 STAT. 842 (1946), reenacted in the codification of Title 28 (Judicial
Code), 62 STAT. 869 (1948), without substantive changes and now appearing
as 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412 and 2671-80
(1950).
3. 338 U.S. 366, 70 Sup. Ct. 207, 94 L. Ed. 171 (1949).
4. REv. STAT. 3477 (1875), 31 U.S.C.A. § 203 (1927).
5. United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 383, 70 Sup.
Ct. 207, 94 L. Ed. 171 (1949).
6. Anderson v. Hayes Const. Co., 243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153 N.E. 28, 29-30
(1926). A New York statute provided that the state might be joined as a
defendant in proceedings to foreclose a mechanic's lien. The state contended,
nevertheless, that such a lien could not be enforced unless the state conceded
that it owed its contractor, the co-defendant. The court found the statute
granting jurisdiction to determine such controversies to be "explicit" and that
it contained no condition "that the remedy is to fail if the debt shall be disputed." Id. at 147.
7. 340 U.S. 543, 71 Sup. Ct. 399, 95 L. Ed. 523 (1951).
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States as alleged joint tort-feasors, and the right to implead the United
States as a third-party defendant for the purpose of contribution,
where local law contemplates contribution, although the jurisdictional
statute is completely silent on this important adjunctive branch of
tort law. In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied in part upon the
fact that "the Act expressly makes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applicable, and Rule 14 provides for third-party practice." a
The requirement of the Act that claims against the United States be
tried without a jury, and the right of private litigants under the
Seventh Amendment to a trial by jury in such cases, were held not to
present insurmountable difficulties. The Court added: "If the Act
develops unanticipated complications, Congress can then meet them
to such extent as it may desire to fit the demonstrated needs."9
This is in interesting contrast with the Court's approach in United
States v. Sherwood,10 where a judgment-creditor joined his judgmentdebtor and the United States in a suit under the Tucker Act. 1 The
plaintiff alleged a breach of contract by the United States with the
judgment-debtor, and the entitlement of the judgment-creditor under
local (New York) law to enforce and to be reimbursed from the claim
of its judgment-debtor. The United States district court dismissed
the complaint as being outside its jurisdiction. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, 12 holding that
under Rule 17 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure plaintiff's
capacity to sue was governed by New York law and also that within
the meaning of that law the United States was a "person indebted."
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, affirming the
opinion of the district court that the Tucker Act did not grant jurisdiction to hear such a suit. The Court held that the procedural
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure added nothing to
the jurisdiction of the district court and that the basic federal statute
"must be strictly interpreted."13 The opinion, by Chief Justice Stone,
also pointed out that the basis of the jurisdiction of the district court
(and of the Court of Claims) under the Tucker Act is derived not
from the Judiciary Article of the Constitution, but from the Congressional power "to pay the debts ...

of the United States," which

Congress is free to exercise through either non-judicial or judicial
agencies. The only constitutional basis for the Federal Tort Claims
8. Id. at 553.

9. Id. at 556.
10. 312 U.S. 584, 61 Sup. Ct. 767, 85 L. Ed. 1058 (1941).
11. 10 STAT. 612 (1855), as amended, 24 STAT. 505 (1887). See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 41(20), 250 (1946).
12. 112 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1940).
13. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590, 61 Sup. Ct. 767, 85 L. Ed.
1058 (1941).
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Act is the legislative power to "pay the debts" of the United States,14
but, strangely enough, this fundamental principle has rarely been adverted to in cases construing the Act.
There has also been a marked judicial thrust toward the finding of
liability on the United States in airplane crash cases, although little
or no evidence is adduced to support the necessary contention that the
claimed injury, loss or death was "caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the government."' 5 Illustrative are
two cases decided by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
7 In the
United States v. Kesinger 6 and United States v. Gaidys.1
Kesingercase the court resorted to the res ipsa loquitur rule to uphold
liability. In Gaidys, after finding that the Government plane "for
some unknown reason" was flying at a low altitude before its crash,
the court said that it was its "view that the flying of the plane below
a safe altitude.., the crash, and the resulting injuries ...constituted
a redressible wrong in the nature of trespass."'18 The same tendency
is reflected in Parcellv. United States.19 The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Praylou, and United States v.
Walker,20 affirmed a finding of liability based on a South Carolina
statute which enacts the Uniform Aeronautics Act. That statute imposes absolute liability on owners of aircraft for injuries to persons
or property on land caused by the ascent, descent or flight of the aircraft or the dropping or falling of any object therefrom. The Government is seeking Supreme Court review of the decision.
The Feres case,2 ' however, should be noted as a deviation from the
tendency to approach problems under the Federal Tort Claims Act
from the premise that the Act is primarily a sweeping waiver of
sovereign immunity. At the outset, the Court in that case observed
that the Act "should be construed to fit ...

into the entire statutory

system of remedies against the Government to make a workable, consistent and equitable whole."2 2 After stating that there were four dif14. "Congress has . . . recently conferred on the district courts exclusive
jurisdiction of tort claims cognizable under the Federal Tort Claims Act ...
enacted pursuant to Art. I powers." National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 593-94, 69 Sup. Ct. 1173, 93 L. Ed. 1556 (1949).
15. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (b) (1950). The proposition that the Federal Tort Claims
Act creates only a respondeat superior liability had become well established
prior to its affirmance by the Dalehite decision. United States v. Campbell, 172
F.2d 500, 503 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 957 (1949); United States v.
Eleazer, 177 F.2d 914, 916 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 903 (1950).
See also Hubsch v. United States, 174 F.2d 7 (5th Ci.), remanded, 338 U.S.
440 (1949), cert. dismissed, 340 U.S. 804 (1950); United States v. Hull, 195 F.2d
64 (5th Cir. 1952); Jackson v. United States, 196 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1952).
16. 190 F.2d 529 (10th Cir. 1951).
17. 194 F.2d 762 (10th Cir. 1952).

18. Id. at 764, 765.

19. 104 F. Supp. 110, 116 (S.D.W. Va. 1951).

20. 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953) (heard together).
21. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 Sup. Ct. 153, 95 L. Ed. 152 (1950).

22. Id. at 139.
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ferent conclusions that might be reached in the case, Mr. Justice
Jackson's opinion

-

from which there was no dissent - said: "There

is as much statutory authority for one as for another of these conclusions."2 3 The Court adopted a conclusion that affirmed the validity
of an important implied exception to the apparent scope of the liability
provisions of the Act. The postulate from which the Court began its
reasoning plainly foreshadowed the result that was reached.
Only in a subsidiary way did the Dalehite case deal with conflicts
arising from the planned integration of local law and federal statutory
requirements, procedural difficulties or any auxiliary aspect of the
Federal Tort Claims Act. The Court was faced with a complex fact
situation, reflected by an enormous record, and the practical construction and application of the most gravid of the express exceptions to
the Act. It is significant that the Court did not rely upon any "sweeping language" 24 in the statute, nor shrink from "refinement of construction" in reaching a solution of the controversy before it. In an
almost admonitory manner the Court commenced its discussion of the
case with the statement that the "Act waived sovereign immunity from
suit for certain specified torts of federal employees. It did not assure
injured persons damages for all injuries caused by such employees." 25
Further on in the opinion the Court said: "Turning to the interpretation of the Act, our reasoning . . . starts from the accepted juris-

prudential principle that no action lies against the United States unless
the legislature has authorized it."126
The Supreme Court's change of vantage in approaching problems
of interpretation under the Federal Tort Claims Act encourages a
criticism of the common description of the Act as a "waiver of
sovereign immunity." Perhaps the use of the expression by both
courts and counsel indicates the general disfavor with the "jurisprudential principle" of non-liability of governments for the harmful
conduct of their employees. The description cannot, however, serve
as an accurate exposition of the scope and legal effect of the Federal
Tort Claims Act. Whatever the historical origin, purpose or social
need of the principle of immunity, it is older than the nation and
cannot now be "waived" as an individual would forego the privilege of
pleading the bar of a statute of limitation. The United States of
America, whether regarded as a governmental organization, a people,
the public treasury, or all of them together, is not an individual, a
business corporation, a municipality or an eleemosynary institution.
23. Id. at 144.

24. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 547, 71 Sup. Ct. 399,

95 L. Ed. 523 (1951).
25. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 17, 73 Sup. Ct. 956, 97 L. Ed. 1427
(1953).
26. Id. at 30.
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The evolved concepts of the legal rights and duties of such entities
can hardly be made to apply to the United States by the device of
waiving or removing a procedural bar to suit. In other words, a
statute waiving sovereign immunity might be more appropriately
called-and construed as- a statute creating government liability.
In one case under the Federal Tort Claims Act, it was necessary for
the court to decide whether the immunity of the United States from
tort liability prior to the date of the passage of the Act "was merely
a procedural impediment." The court held that it was more than
that, and that "the immunity of the United States from suit necessarily
implies that no substantive right of action existed against it.127 It is
submitted that this is a correct view. If it is, then the statute that
removes the impediment, in order to be effective at all, defines the
right of action permitted against the formerly nonliable sovereign.
"For a tort is a tort in a legal sense only because the law has made it
SO."128

It is not the purpose of this comment to analyse the Court's several
holdings in the Dalehite case or to discuss the probable precedential
force of its interpretation of the "discretionary function" exception
to the Federal Tort Claims Act. The factual situation in the case and
the theory on which the plaintiffs chose to present their claims against
the Government make the case one that is not likely to be closely
paralleled. This important exception will, no doubt, receive future
judicial consideration and there will be a further process of inclusion
and exclusion of programs and activities of federal agencies and employees of the Government with relation to the ambit of "discretionary
function or duty." The diverse situations in which the exception has
already been applied is the subject of several thoughtful law review
comments. 29
It may be that the decision will become more of a landmark for
its rejection of absolute liability than as a definitive interpretation
of Section 2680 (a) of the Judicial Code. As herein indicated, it appears that the case is also noteworthy in that the court for almost the
first time regarded the Federal Tort Claims Act as a schematic whole
that creates a limited range of liability rather than a mere immunitywaiving declaration of the legislature.
27. Commissioners of the State Ins. Fund v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 549,
554 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).

28. The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433, 42 Sup. Ct. 159, 66 L. Ed. 299 (1922).

29. Notes, 66 HARV. L. REV. 488 (1953), 45 ILL. L. REV. 791 (1951), 27 IND. L.J.
121 (1951); Comment, 36 MARQ. L. REv. 88 (1952); 37 GEO. L.J. 646 (1949);
5 Mlmn L.Q. 634 (1951); 101 U. OF PA. L. REv.420 (1952).

